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Although brief this war is internationally renowned, made famous by the 1964 and 1979 films Zulu and Zulu Dawn, along with numerous TV documentaries. It was a classic colonial confrontation between the strength of the British Imperial military machine against poorly equipped native forces. Nonetheless, it was not such a one-sided contest as it first appears.
The British forces although numerically small, were well-armed, trained and disciplined. However, they lacked effective communications, endured supply difficulties, and were unacclimatised to local conditions. Against the British were seemingly overwhelming numbers of Zulu, also disciplined and fearless. They also benefited from better communications, intelligence of their opponents’ movements and had greater familiarity with the terrain. However, the Zulu were poorly armed, and lacked proper rifle training. | | | Context | | | What were the reasons for the war? The British, since 1824, had established an important trading post in Port Natal (now Durban) maintaining good relations with their indigenous neighbours. Until 1868 Natal developed slowly, but when gold and diamonds were discovered at Kimberley, this growth quickened. Further economic expansion was hampered by the Zulu territory and although half-hearted discussions took place between the British and the Zulu chiefs to agree a Confederation of joint control, naturally under British domination, no agreement was reached. Finally, following a series of minor border incidents an ultimatum was issued to Cetywayo, the Zulu king, entailing impossible demands including disbanding his army and the loss of Zululand independence. This he rejected, as the British had expected, and therefore war and invasion of Zululand was inevitable and indeed desired by Sir Bartle Frere, the British Governor of Cape Colony. | | | 1st Invasion | | The war had three distinct, yet related phases. The first phase is dominated by the first invasion of Zululand taking place between January to April 1879. The plan for the British attack, under the command of Lord Chelmsford, was to invade Zululand using three offensive columns attacking from both Natal and Transvaal and to converge at Ulundi the Zulu King’s homestead. Chelmsford’s principal forces were two battalions of the 24th Regiment, the 1st composed of battle-hardened troops, whilst the 2nd consisted of younger, less experienced men. In addition, Chelmsford commanded only one Royal Artillery battery of 7-pound guns and also began the war hampered in having no regular cavalry support. These regular forces were greatly supplemented by the Natal Native Contingent (NNC), composed of poorly equipped local black and white auxiliaries, some of whom were mounted infantry.
The war began on 11th January as Chelmsford’s central column (No 3) consisting of around 4,000 men crossed into Zululand. The first major battle was at Isandlwana camp on the 22nd January. Chelmsford, unaware of the imminent attack, had already departed to relieve an expeditionary force trapped by 1,000 Zulu at Mangeni. Therefore the remaining British forces at the camp were much reduced to only 1,707 men and 67 officers to resist an attack of 20,000 Zulu.
The battle started positively with the British holding the Zulu attacks and suffering only light casualties. However, an outer wing of the defence was soon running low on ammunition, which was exacerbated by incompetent quartermasters’ inability to issue further ammunition to them. This section’s subsequent retreat was initially in good order but quickly became scattered. This led to the main defences becoming exposed on that side and unable to defend itself, thus allowing the Zulu to enter and over-run the defences. The British troops, with their advantage lost in hand to hand fighting, were soon overwhelmed. Many attempted to escape the onslaught but were overtaken and killed by another horn of the Zulu force or drowned attempting to cross flooded rivers. This was the worst defeat suffered by the British by a native force with only 60 whites and 400 African auxiliaries surviving.
However, Chelmsford was to suffer a further disappointment. The next day, the 23rd, returning to the devastated Isandlwana camp he learned of a further attack this time at Rorke’s Drift. This staging post had been requisitioned as supply depot and hospital for Chelmsford’s central column. 4,000 Zulu, previously held in reserve at Isandlwana battle, now seeking glory had attacked the camp for twelve hours. This time the defence, consisting only of 139 men of whom 35 were sick, had withstood the siege. Fearing the worst Chelmsford set out quickly with his central column to Rorke’s Drift, but with much relief discovered that the depot had not fallen.
To the south-east, along the coastal strip at Inyanzani (Nyezane), a more successful engagement had been waged on the same day as Isandlwana. No 1 column consisting of a total of 5,000 regular and NNC men led by Colonel Charles Pearson had repelled a 6,000 strong Zulu attempt to stop the British advance to Ulundi. By the end of the day Pearson’s troops, suffering only 12 fatalities, had killed at least 400 Zulu, and had advanced a further 4 miles towards their objective, the disused staging post at Ekowe (Eshowe), which was finally reached the next day.
Ekowe was planned to be a forward depot for the final advance to Ulundi but, because of the setbacks at Isandlwana, its original strategic position was now in doubt. Indeed, Pearson received the indecisive instructions from Chelmsford stating ‘consider all my instructions cancelled and act in whatever manner you think most desirable in the interests of the column under your command.’ Pearson decided to dig-in and prepare heavy fortifications to the garrison. However, instead of a potentially suicidal frontal attack the Zulu lay siege to the camp, conducted a war of attrition and simply waited for disease and malnutrition to take its toll. Ekowe was to suffer these siege conditions for 71 days.
An example of the constant harassment endured throughout the war by the British forces by the Zulu was at the Intombi River crossing, northern Zululand. On 7th March a wagon convoy guarded by 106 men was making for Luneburg garrison, but became trapped by flood conditions, and easily attacked. The dawn strike by 800 Zulu killed 62 British men, and the wagons were looted.
Another more important engagement was also lost at Hlobane, also in north Zululand on the 28th March, by the sole remaining British offensive force still active, commanded by Colonel H. E. Wood. This was a rare example of a British attack on a Zulu stronghold. Unfortunately, the assault on an impregnable hilltop location was poorly chosen and easily repelled that quickly became a disorganised retreat, then a rout. Through many acts of incredible bravery, confirmed by the award of five Victoria Crosses, Wood and his men just managed to avoid another massacre, but nonetheless still suffered losses of 15 officers and 79 men dead, along with many wounded. However, the next day, Wood had his revenge on the same Zulu army when another battle took place at nearby Kambula camp, this time with the British initially in defensive mode. Although he commanded a similar force as Chelmsford’s at Isandlwana he repelled a 20,000 strong attack and went on to rout the Zulu army with as many as 2,000 killed. This time Wood’s losses were proportionally slight with 18 men killed and 65 wounded.
The British Government, hearing news of the massacre at Isandlwana, sent out substantial numbers of reinforcements including 10,500 men, plus two cavalry regiments with further service personnel to organise the complicated logistics. Further troops were deployed from Cape Town along with troops from the naval brigade from re-routed ships. With these new troops Chelmsford embarked on the relief of Ekowe. On the way he had to repel a concerted attack at Ginglelova (Gingindlovu) of about 12,000 Zulu, but through the use of Gatling guns 1,000 Zulu were killed with only a few British casualties. Ekowe was finally relieved in early April. Once there, however, Chelmsford promptly decided not to defend the camp and instead retreated back to Natal. In effect Chelmsford had returned to where he started and hence the first invasion had achieved very little. | | | 2nd Invasion | | The second invasion necessitated far greater planning not only because of the increased number of men, transport and supplies at Chelmsford’s command, but also the Government and for Chelmsford personally needed to ensure a complete victory this time. This second invasion commenced from 27th May in cooler winter weather. This invasion was not only a much strengthened British force but also had improved supplies, communications and had a greater understanding of the conditions and warring capabilities of the Zulu.
Again the main column used the Rorke’s Drift route into Zululand, which made for an uncomfortable sight to the newly arrived troops but they detoured around the devastation at Isandlwana camp. This time the invasion was successful with relatively few British casualties. This was not solely due to stronger fire power but the British had learnt the value in skirmishing and the importance of burning grain stores and kraals, so hampering the servicing of large numbers of Zulu with an undermining effect on their fighting morale.
On 4th July the final and decisive battle for the second invasion took place at Ulundi, the Zulu king’s homestead. The British forces amounted to over 5,000 troops facing at least 20,000 Zulu warriors. The regular cavalry defended the flanks and was very effective in countering the Zulu advantage of movement in the field. This allowed the overwhelming British fire power to easily repel the attacks and kill so many Zulu quickly that the battle was won in half an hour. The British casualties only amounted to ten fatalities and eighty-seven wounded, whilst over a thousand Zulu were killed. The Zulu fighting spirit had almost been extinguished. | | | Aftermath | | The third and final phase of the war was the mopping-up of pockets of Zulu resistance, which was not complete until September. But the British aim was not solely about winning the war in the field, but more importantly, the overall objective was demoralising the Zulu people. This was achieved through destroying their food supplies and important cultural elements, for instance, the Royal House’s ancestral graves. Consequently, the Zulu chiefs realised that they were now powerless for further resistance.
The British solution of appointing 13 chiefs each with a division of the original nation led, eventually, to a brutal civil war that would see the complete destruction of the Zulu kingdom. Today Zululand is part of the Republic of South Africa.
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