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First Boer War, 1880-1881 |
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| Background | | The origin and context for this war is found much earlier in the century when Britain acquired the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa from the Dutch in 1815 during the Napoleonic Wars. British colonial expansion although initially peaceful was, from the 1830s, marked by skirmishes and wars against the Boers and native tribes for most of the remainder of the century.
The Boers were descendents from earlier Dutch settlers arriving in South Africa in 1652. The Boers were fiercely independent people, practised a strong Calvinist religion and were excellent fighters willing to counter any disruption to their semi-nomadic farming traditions. Their two territories of Orange Free State and Transvaal were squeezed between the British-ruled Cape Colony to the south and east, Zululand to the west and other European-ruled colonies to the north. The inevitable skirmishes start in 1838-48 but then only entailed a small number of British troops. Now the conflict involved up to 3,000 British troops and over 6,000 Boers.
British aggressiveness was fuelled by three prime motivations. Initially, as part of a general colonial expansion into South Africa in order to control the Indian Ocean and its trade routes to India that passed the Cape. Second, the discovery, in 1868, of huge mineral deposits of gold and diamonds around Kimberley on the joint borders of Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Cape, which offered enormous wealth and power. Third, this was a time of rapid European colonisation, therefore strategically important that Britain assumed rule over these two Boer states before anyone else. Other potential colonisers included Portugal (who already controlled East and West Africa), Germany (South West Africa), and further north, Belgium (Congo) and France (West and Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar).
The history between Boers and the British was one of mutual distrust and dislike. However, in 1877 the state of Transvaal, bankrupt and impoverished, was peacefully annexed by the British at the request of the Boer Burgers in order to stop its complete disintegration and their land being re-absorbed by native tribes. This annexation was unpopular with the ordinary Boers, which resulted in a growing nationalism and resentment against the British occupation. By 1879 this had intensified into open revolt culminating in a proclamation, led by Paul Kruger, of Transvaal independence to an assembly of 4,000 Boers who swore to fight for their freedom. Thus began the first Boer war. | | | Hostilities | | Although generally called a war the actual engagements were of a relatively minor nature considering the few men involved on both sides and the short duration of the combat, lasting some ten weeks of sporadic action. The ‘war’ started on 20th December 1880 with the massacre of 76 troops and 100 wounded of the 94th Regiment at Bronkhorst Spruit. This mainly Irish regiment was peacefully marching westwards towards Pretoria, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Anstruther, when were halted by a Boer commando group. Its leader, Piet Joubert, ordered them to turn back as this territory was now again a Boer Republic and therefore any further advance would be deemed an act of war. Anstruther refused to obey and ordered that ammunition be distributed. With that command he was shot by the opening salvo from nearly 200 Boers concealed around the British column. The ambushed British troops were annihilated and within ten minutes, with the majority of his troops dead or wounded, the dying Anstruther ordered the surrender.
The Boer uprising also caught by surprise the six small British forts scattered around Transvaal, housing some 2,000 troops between them, including irregulars with as few as fifty men at Lydenburg in the east where Anstruther had just left. In being isolated and with so few troops all the forts could do was prepare for siege conditions against the superior number of Boers, and wait to be relieved. The other five forts, with a minimum of fifty miles between any two, were at Wakkerstroom and Standerton in the south, Marabastadt in the north and Potchefstroom and Rustenburg in the west.
The three main engagements of the war were all within about sixteen miles of each other, centred on the Battles of Laing’s Nek (28/1/81), Ingogo River (8/2/81) and the rout at Majuba Hill (27/2/81). These battles were the outcome of Major-General George Pomeroy-Colley’s attempts to relieve the besieged forts. Although Colley had requested reinforcements these would not reach him until mid-February, but he was convinced that the garrisons would not survive until then. Consequently, he mustered a relief column of available men amounting to only 1,200 men at Newcastle, near the Transvaal border. Colley’s force was further weakened in having few mounted troops, a necessity in this terrain and type of warfare, whereas most Boers were mounted and good riders. Nonetheless, Colley’s force set out on 24th January 1881 northwards for Laing’s Nek on route to relieve Wakkerstroom and Standerton, the nearest forts. | | | Laing’s Nek | | | Laing’s Nek, a low ridge, was held by 2,000 Boer to which Colley, who had been misinformed of the Boers’ strength, ordered a frontal attack on 28th January. The British charge was easily beaten back by the accuracy and power of the Boer defence with 83 killed, including all the officers of the 58th Regiment who spearheaded the attack, and over 100 wounded. | | | Ingogo River | | After this repulse Colley sought refuse at Mount Prospect, three miles to the south and await reinforcements. However, Colley was soon forced back into action. On the 7th February a mail escort on its way to Newcastle had been attacked and driven back to Mount Prospect. Therefore the next day Colley, determined to maintain his supplies and communication route open, escorted the mail wagon personally and this time with a larger escort. Again the Boer attacked the convoy, also with a stronger force of some 300 men at the Ingogo River crossing. Although the fire-power was evenly matched and continued for several hours, the Boers had dominated the action until darkness and a storm permitted Colley and the remainder of his troops to retreat back to Mount Prospect.
In this, perhaps unnecessary, engagement the British lost 139 officers and men, half the original force that had set out to escort the mail convoy. Although this was Colley’s supply and communication route it seemed poor judgement to split his forces unnecessarily between escort duty and Mount Prospect’s defences. Indeed, was it really necessary for Colley himself to take command of the convoy that was liable to attack and its subsequent retreat? | | | Majuba Hill | | On 14th February hostilities ceased, awaiting the outcome of peace negotiations initiated by an offer from Kruger. During this time Colley’s promised reinforcements arrived with more to follow. However, the British government’s attitude to the Boers was conciliatory and had offered a Royal Commission investigation and possible troop withdrawal. Colley was critical of this stance and hence, whilst waiting for Kruger’s final agreement, decided to attack again in order for the government to negotiate from a position of strength.
So, on 26th February, Colley led a night march of some 360 men to the top of Majuba Hill that overlooked the main Boer position. What Colley thought he would achieve by this foolhardy action is difficult to assess with the Boer position being out of rifle range and therefore could only observe their activities. The next morning, with Colley still occupying the summit, the Boer started to ascend the hill. By 7 a.m. the Boer were in action, shooting accurately and using all available natural cover as they continued their advance towards the trapped British position. From 11 a.m. Colley’s command and understanding of the dire situation seemed to deteriorate sending unclear signals to Mount Prospect by heliograph, first requesting reinforcements and the next stating that the Boers were retreating. What was clear, however, despite pockets of stiff resistance the Boer were close to overwhelming the British position. Colley could have possibly retrieved the situation if he had given the order to charge the Boer, as repeatedly requested by his officers, but persistently refused. Then a little later, under the Boer’s devasting rifle-fire, the British line collapsed as panic spread with men fleeing downhill to escape the onslaught, yet many were still killed by the Boer’s accurate shooting. Colley himself fell victim to this firepower along with a total of 285 killed or wounded of his men.
Hostilities continued until 6th March 1881, when a truce was declared on the same terms that Colley had disparaged. The Transvaal forts had endured, contrary to Colley’s forecast, with the sieges being generally uneventful, the Boers content to wait for hunger and sickness to strike. The forts had suffered only light casualties the outcome of sporadic engagements, except at Potchefstroom where twenty-four were killed and seventeen at Pretoria resulting from occasional raids on Boer positions.
Both sides ratified the Convention of Pretoria in August 1881 that granted Transvaal independence, with the Boers accepting the Queen’s nominal rule and British control over African affairs and native districts. However, after the war Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, a former conservative Colonial Secretary, made the prophetic judgement regarding Gladstone’s Government handling of the truce stating ‘not only that peace shall not be lasting, but it shall be the precursor of indefinitely worse trouble than any from which their weak yielding has for the moment delivered them.’ The future, unfortunately, was to prove Hicks-Beach right, with the 2nd Boer War eventually involving 190,000 British and Colonial troops. | |
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